Aspartame Task Force investigation: “What was discovered was reprehensible.. incredibly sloppy science.” A 1980 public board of inquiry opined that the company’s testing procedures were “bizarre.”
66) Searle’s decision to market aspartame culminated with the falsification of test results to obtain FDA approval . In November 1969, officials of the firm hired Dr. Harry Waisman, a researcher for the University of Wisconsin, to test for brain damage in rhesus monkeys. Seven monkeys were fed aspartame for periods up to one year. In the end, though, the evaluation flopped because the technicians failed to perform the intelligence tests and autopsies required to determine brain damage. When questioned about the false data by the FDA, Searle officials claimed to have had no direct control over the study. But the protocol for the study was written by a Searle pathologist *after* it had begun. And, according to Dr. Gross, “Frequent high-level communications took place between Searle executives and Dr. Waisman prior to and during the study.”
67) To make matters worse, Dr. Waisman died in March, 1971, in mid-study. Searle submitted the toxicity test to the FDA on October 12, 1972. It bore Dr. Waisman’s name as coauthor. Richard Merrill noted: “Dr. Waisman was the expert in the field and his name would carry great weight,” but complained to Skinner that Searle took “great literary license” in drafting the report, “which *covers up* the admitted inadequacy of the design, control and documentation of this study.”
68) Searle submitted some 150 test reports, yet Dr. Martha Freeman of the FDA Bureau of Drugs noted in a 1973 memo, “the information provided is inadequate to permit an evaluation of the potential toxicity of aspartame.”
69) The FDA task force set up by Dr. Schmidt in 1975 reviewed 25 studies on seven products manufactured by G.D. Searle, a total of 500 pages and 15,000 exhibits.
70 Searle was held to be the author of “reports that the FDA believes contain false information” and “concealed facts resulting from having drafted Dr. Waisman’s ‘pilot’ monkey study so that it would *appear* to be a valid, thorough scientific study,” and not a forgery.
In 1975 Searle submitted a battery of cancer test results entitled “The Willigan Report, which contained a statistical table that excluded four malignant mammary tumors detected by Dr. Willigan and incorporated in his data. The malignancies were made to appear benign. Searle dismissed the misrepresentation as a computer “programming error” undetected by supervising statisticians. Dr. Gross interviewed all concerned with the tests. He concluded in a statement to Metzenbaum’s committee in August, 1985, that “to accept the Searle explanation is to believe that the unfavorable mammary malignancy data were innocently omitted from the
summary table four separate times by three different individuals.”
71) The Waisman and Willigan Reports were prepared by Searle Labs, as were 88% of the safety evaluations conducted by 1981.
72) They are typical of the shoddy documentation upon which FDA Commissioner Hayes based his decision that aspartame does not constitute a public health risk. Although two members of the 1975 task force considered the tests to be
criminal frauds, Hayes and Searle declared the results valid. In an appeal to Hayes’ decision, James Turner said: “The entire argument that since the studies are no longer considered fraudulent *by FDA* they are therefore scientifically valid is an example of a rhetorical shell game that, if successful, can only bring discredit and ridicule on the
73) Dr. Gross, the chief scientist on the FDA task force, told the CBS Nightly News staff in January, 1984, that Searle made “deliberate” decisions” to cloak the toxic effects of aspartame. “They took great pains to camouflage these shortcomings of the study,” Gross said, “as I say, filter and just present to the FDA what they wished the FDA to know. And they did other *terrible* things. For instance, animals would develop tumors while they were under study-well, G.D. Searle would “remove these tumors from the animals,” surgically masking the cancerous effects of aspartame.
74)Yet one 1986 New England Journal of Medicine article claimed that noncompulsive aspartame intake has “no
Dr. Woodrow Monte told CBS, “Every time a truly impartial team of scientists have looked at NutraSweet, it has been turned down.” Dr.
Monte, director of the nutrition laboratory at Arizona State University, held that these studies “show *extreme* dangers over the long term.”
75) Dr. Monte was rewarded for his comments by a fusillade from the press. On February 23, Dan Dorfman, a business news reporter for WCBS in New York, broke a story that several CBS employees had invested in options
on NutraSweet that pay off if the stock price drops.
76) Dr. Monte and his attorney had purchased the options as well. It emerged that the CBS staffers had purchased the options on the advice of stock market newsletters printed prior to the nightly news report. The investments were not illegal, nor did they reap a profit. Searle’s stock was not affected by the publicity, and the investors took a loss.
Nevertheless, the Wall Street Journal ran a front-page story condemning the “inside trading.” Reed Irvine’s Accuracy in Media picked
up the cudgel against Dr. Monte and the CBS employees as if they’d committed a shocking Wall Street swindle.
77) Accuracy in Media, formed in 1969, is an intelligence operation abetted by the CIA. The rabidly
right-wing organization was co-founded by Bernard Yoh, a counter-insurgency adviser under the notorious Edward Landsdale in Vietnam, and a fount of CIA funds to military intelligence units in the Delta region. Board member Elbridge Durbrow was once a foreign service “diplomat,” and advised commanders of Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. Another AIM board member, Frank Trager, has conducted research for the Pentagon and CIA, and churns out pamphlets on international business and intelligence operations. Major financial contributors to AIM include Richard Nixon, “Bebe” Rebozo, Edward Scripps, the wretched Dr. Edward Teller and former
Treasury Secretary William E. Simon.
78) Accuracy in Media is a strident advocate of the chemical industry, which provides it with generous funding. The media “watchdog” has long waged a campaign on behalf of dioxin, denouncing the “Agent Orange scare” as the creation of delirious, anti-business liberals. Among the leading manufacturers of Agent Orange for the Vietnam war effort was Monsanto, preparing-at the very moment AIM took aim at detractors of NutraSweet[TM]- to buy G.D. Searle.
The Good Stuff
Dr. Monte cautioned in 1987 that he didn’t want to sound like a “conspiracy theory” hound, but the aspartame chronology clarifies its
commercial emergence. The FDA Board of Inquiry advised against the sweetener on September 30, 1980. On January21, 1981-the day after Reagan’s inauguration-Searle submitted “ten new studies.” Dr. Monte was skeptical. “It is impossib1e that they could have conducted those studies in four months,” he said. “Obviously they’d previously done those studies but hadn’t officially submitted them, although much of the information in those studies was informally presented to the board of inquiry.” With the “new tests” in hand, Hayes acted as though critical, overriding evi dence had proven the safety of aspartame.
79) James Turner, representing thc Community Nutrition Institute in Washington, D.C., said that Arthur Hull Hayes, to arrive at his decision that aspartame is safe, fire-walked apath “through a mass of scientific mismanagement, improper procedures, wrong conclusions and general scientific inexactness.” Two FDA officials declared in 1985 that Hayes was determined to clear all obstacles to NutraSweet approval. One FDA bureaucrat reported that “people at the top” were closed to questions concerning the quality of the tests submitted by Searle.
80) In July, 1984 a broad investigation of NutraSweet’s adverse effects was conducted by the FDA and the Centers for Disease Control. Federal health officials said at the outset that they believed no harm would emerge from the data to indict aspartame. Robert McQuate, Ph.D., science director of the National Soft Drink Association, predicted with mystical confidence that the study would “provide further evidence that aspartame is a safe ingredient.”
81) Dr. McQuate didn’t fret the goring of his biochemical ox. In November the CDC announced that no “serious, widespread” side effects had been found.
82)It was “unlikely,” said CDC officials, that “complainers” could establish a link between NutraSweet and their maladies-the same bromide once tossed to victims of radiation experiments. The reported side-effects of aspartame fell into two distinct categories: central nervous system (65%) and gastrointestinal disorders (24%).
83) Yet the CDC claimed erroneously that no consistent reaction pattern had been found.
84) Robert Shapiro, then president of Nutrasweet, used the occasion to enthuse that the survey “clearly established the safety” of the sugar substitute.
85)Nevertheless, the CDC recommended a new set of studies because aspartame users continued to complain of ill effects.
Based on the ersatz assurances of the CDC report, PepsiCo announced that it would drop saccharine and begin sweetening its diet drinks entirely with aspartame. The decision would have been approved by Wayne Calloway, then CEO of PepsiCo and director of the multinationals Citicorp, General Electric and Exxon. In 1983 soda bottlers, organized around Pepsi had petitioned the FDA for a delay in approval of NutraSweet for soft drinks until further evaluation verified its safety-interpreted by market analysts as a ploy to drive down the price of the sweetener. They soon abandoned the effort to block approval (and all health concerns they might have had). “We believe saccharine is safe,” Pepsi USA President Roger Enrico lied, but “we wanted the taste improvement.” PepsiCo, already drawing on a tenth of Searle’s 7.5 million pound annual production of aspartame, signed an agreement with G.D. Searle to boost purchases 500 percent.
86) (Like other corporate pushers of aspartame, Pepsi has long maintained ties to the intelligence community. One
product of the relationship was a Pepsi plant in Vientiane, Laos with a laboratory outfitted for heroin production. Alfred McCoy, in *The
Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* documents the efforts of Richard Nixon to promote the plant’s construction in 1965, and the CIA’s
continuing subsidization of the plant. McCoy complained to Pepsi officials that the facilities were but a cover for the importation and
refinement of morphine, but it continued to operate unhindered.)
Yet another report was filed by Reagan’s General Accounting Office in July 1987, this one on the FDA’s handling of aspartame. The GAO
concluded that the agency had followed proper procedures and conducted valid studies. But the report noted that the FDA had followed guidelines for food -not drug- testing, despite the recommendation of the agency’s own biologists favoring *drug* tests, which are considerably more stringent. This recommendation was overruled by FDA officials.
87)) Another blemish in the study was bared by Dr. Louis Elsas, director of medical genetics at Emory University in Atlanta. “They never asked the right questions about what it does to brain function in humans,” he told the Washington Post. Half of the scientists polled expressed reservations about the safety of NutraSweet. One-fifth reported “major concerns.” Monsanto quibbled in a press release that these critics had themselves never conducted aspartame research. A score of independent scientists have. They found side effects.
Senator Metzenbaum berated Searle’s flawed and fabricated tests at the August 1, 1985 Senate hearings. “The FDA,” he said, “is content to have the manufacturer of aspartame, G.D. Searle, conduct these studies. How absurd.”
He also faulted the AMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association recently published a report on aspartame which, with some significant disclaimers, stated it was safe for most people. I wish that this report could ease my concerns. It does not. It merely restates the FDA position which relies solely on the tests conducted by G.D. Searle. As I have indicated these tests are under a cloud. In addition, the concerns raised recently by the scientists … were not even included in the report.
In defense of the tests, executives of G.D. Searle argued that the sweetener has been approved by foreign regulatory agencies and the World Health Organization. But H.J. Roberts, an internal medicine specialist in West Palm Beach, Florida, reviewed the foreign studies and found that “the vast majority of these agencies accepted company-sponsored research without ever having done independent confirmatory studies.”
88) Deficiencies in testing were aggravated by a lack of laboratory training at Searle. One of the pivotal safety studies involved fetal damage, but the FDA task force found that the medical researcher in charge was “inexperienced in conducting studies of this nature and yet given full responsibility.” They were appalled to discover that his sole credential was a field study of the cottontail rabbit for the Illinois Wildlife Service, yet at Searle he’d been assigned to laboratory training and supervision. When asked about his *curriculum vitae* in fetal research, he replied that he’d once attended a seminar on the subject, and the company had provided him with a stack of reference works.
89) (Yet J.D. Searle, in its 1981 Annual Report, billed itself as “a research based pharmaceutical company.”)
Corporate control of NutraSweet testing continues at Monsanto, torturing the ethics of academic medicine. In August 1987 the University of Illinois, a recipient of Monsanto’s largess, issued a study exonerating aspartame of causing seizures in laboratory animals. Dave Hattan, a safety regulator for the FDA, responded that the study only confirmed the need for testing on humans. At independent labs, he insisted, aspartame provoked seizures.
Industrial support tends to contaminate test data. Dr. Elsas, in a 1988 letter to the New England Journal of Medicine, advocates unbiased review of clinical research. “The NutraSweet Co.,” he said, “may have had an interest in protocols that would find that their product had no untoward effects.”
90) Monsanto reportedly granted one NutraSweet researcher a $1.3 million honorarium.
91) The same hired gun willing to manipulate lab results will have no qualms publicly defending a tainted pharmaceutical, like the diabetic specialist who objected that a Senate hearing on aspartame, which called him as a witness, might arouse groundless public anxiety.
92) Victims and health activists have attempted in the courts to put a stop to the marketing of NutraSweet, to no avail. In 1985 a coalition of consumer groups were handed a ruling by the federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that the FDA had followed proper procedures in approving aspartame for soft drinks. A year later the Washington Post reported that the Supreme Court again refused to consider the case “despite critics’ arguments that the product, sold under the brand name NutraSweet, may cause brain damage.”
93) Likewise, the medical establishment has thrown up an impenetrable wall to aspartame critics. Dr. Roberts, author of a brief study, “Aspartame-Associated Confusion and Memory Loss: A Possible Human Model for Early Alzheimer’s Disease,” found it impossible to publish the article in a peer review medical journal. This was peculiar, he thought, “considering the increasing magnitude of Alzheimer’s disease, and the relevance of my observations to newer biochemical findings and avenues of research.” He can “personally vouch for the *enormous* difficulty in getting published articles concerning reactions to aspartame products,” a trend in censorship with “ominous overtones.” The options, Dr. Roberts says, are “generally limited to ‘burying’ the findings in a small-circulation journal (such as the bulletin of a county medical society), reporting the results as a letter to the editor, or (unfortunately, most often)
discarding the project.”
94) Silence surrounds the most odious conspiracies.
1. “Sweet Talk,” Science and the Citizen column, Scientific American, July, 1987, p. 15.
2. “Adverse Effects of Aspartame-January ‘86 through December ‘90,” Current Bibliography series, National Library of Medicine pamphlet,
National Institutes of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1991.
3. “Pepsi Switches Sweeteners-Aspartame Winning Diet Cola Market,” Washington Post, November 2, 1984, p. A-1.
4. Mae Brussell, World Watchers #842, KAZU-FM, Monterey, CA., January 25, 1988.
5. Moody ’s Industrial Manual, 1975, p 2606
6. G.D. Searle’s 1981 Annual Report. Also, Arnold Foster and Benjamin R. Epstein, *Cross-Currents*, Doubleday & Co. (New York: 1956), p. 153.
7. Nancy Lisagor and Frank Lipsius, *A Law Unto Itself: The Untold Story of the Law Firm of Sullivan & Cromwell*, William Morrow (New York: 1988), pp. 13738, 163.
8. John Marks, *The Search for “The Manchurian Candidate “: The CIA and Mind Control*, Times Books (New York: 1979), pp.58,67 & 212. Marks writes that incapacitating “large numbers of people fell to the Army Chemical Corps, which also tested LSD and even stronger hallucinogens. The CIA concentrated on individuals.”
9. John Peer Nugent, *White Night.- The Untold Story of What Happened Before-and Beyond-Jonestown*, Rawson, Wade (New York: 1979), pp. 143, 177.
10. Michael Meiers, *Was Jonestown a CIA Medical Experiment?A Review of the Evidence*, Mellen House (Lampeter, UK: 1988) p. 42.
11. Ibid., p. 43.
12. Ibid., pp. 42-43. For a sanitized account of Dr. Layton’s career, see Min S. Yee and Thomas N. Layton, *In My Father ’s House: The Story of the Layton Family and the Reverend Jim Jones*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston (New York, 1981).
13. National Council of the National Front of Democratic Germany and the Committee of Anti-Fascist Resistance Fighters of the German Democratic Republic, *The Brown Book: War and Nazi Criminals in West Germany*, Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1965, pp. 33-34.
14. Dan J. Forrestal, *Faith, Hope & $5,000: The Story of Monsanto*, Simon and Schuster (New York: 1977), p. 159.
15. *Brown Book*, p. 34.
16. Tom Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Hunt for the Nazi Scientists*, Little, Brown & Co. (Boston 1987), pp. 93, 95.
17. Howard W. Ambruster, *Treason’s Peace: German Dyes and American Dupes*, Beechhurst Press (New York: 1947), p.144
18. Nigel West, *MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations, 1909-1945*, Random House (New York: 1983), p.92
19. Jaques Attali, *A Man of Influence: The Extraordinary Career of S. G. Warburg*, Adler & Adler (Bethesda, Maryland: 1987),p. 167.
20. Forrestal, p. 121ff.
21. Anthony Cave Brown, *The Last Hero, Wild Bill Donovan*, Vintage (New York: 1982), pp. 210211. Also: Ernst Hanfstangl, Unheard Witness, J.R. Lippincott (New York: 1957)
22. “Search for the Tiger’s Treasure,” Las Vegas Sun, December 26, 1993, p.1.
23. Moody ’s Industrial Manual, 1968, p. 4080.
24. “Radiation and the Guinea Pigs,” Guardian, March 3, 1994, p. 3. Also see, “Nuclear Scientists Irradiated People in Secret Research,”
New York Times, December 17, 1993, p. Al.
25. Christopher Simpson, *Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects On the Cold War*, Wiedenfeld & Nicholson (New York: 1988), pp. 26, 152-53. Col. Pash, a former high school gym teacher, was an officer of the Office of Policy coordination under Frank Wisner. His unit, writes Simpson, “known as PB/7, was given a written charter that read in part that ‘PB/7 will be responsible for assassinations, kidnaping, and such other functions as from time to time may be given it… by higher authority.”‘ Pash was a member of the Russian Orthodox Church, a veteran of the Russian Civil War. Monsanto’s Clinton Engineering Works in Oak Ridge became the Manhattan Project’s headquarters in 1943, and was “manned almost entirely by experienced officers and agents of the CIC.” See lan Sayer and Douglas Botting, *America’s Secret Army: The Untold Story of the Counter intelligence Corps*, Franklin Watts (New York: 1989), pp. 71ff.,346.
26. Robin Thomas Naylor, *Hot Money and the Politics of Debt*, Simon & Schuster (New York, 1987), p.289.
27. “Statement from Adrian Gross, Former FDA Investigator and Scientist,” Congressional Record, August 1, 1985, p. S10835.
28. Florence Graves, “How Safe is Your Diet Soft Drink?” Common Cause, July/August,1984.
30. “FDA Finding on Aspartame,” New York Times, January 14,1984, p. 28.
31. Article in Medical World News,1978, cited in I .N. Love “NutraSweet Isn’t that Sweet,” Gentle Strength Times, October 1987, p. 3.
32. “Dick Wurtman’s Ideas Aren’t So Crazy After All,” Business Week, December 14, 1992, p. 60.
33 . “A Sour View of Aspartame ,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 25, 1987.
34. “Amendment No. 60″ (debate), Congressional Record, May 7, l985, p.S5516.
35. “Lobbyist’s Cozy Ties with Ex-Boss Sen. Hatch Include Client Referrals, Political Fund-Raising,” Wall Street Journal, February 18,
1993. Eli Lilly contributed $17,500 to Hatch’s campaign chest between 1985 and 1988. Sen. Hatch filed a of friend-of-the-court brief on behalf of Eli Lilly in a 1989 patent case. Other pharmaceutical houses enjoy his political favors. Lobbyist Thomas Parry remains a key adviser to Sen. Hatch:- “Nobody gets better care than his former chief of staff,”
reports the Journal.
37. Jane E. Brody, “Sweetener Worries Some Scientists,” Science Times, February 5, 1985.
38. Who ’s Who in Industry and Finance, 97th ed., Macmillian (Wilmette, IL.) p. 583.
39.”Food and Drug Administration Food Additive Approval Process Followed for Aspartame,” GAO Report B223552, June 18,1987.
40. “GAO Investigating NutraSweet Approval,” UPI, reprinted in Congressional Record, August 1, 1985,p. S10823.
42. “Head of FDA Tested Drugs on Volunteers,” Washington Post, June 26, 1983, p. A4.
43. Austin H. Kiplinger, *Washington Now*, Harper & Row (New York: 1975), pp. 36-37.
44. Daniel Guttman and Barry Willner, *The Shadow Government: The Government’s Multimillion Dollar Giveaway of its Decision-Making Powers to Private Management Consultants, ”Experts, ” and Think Tanks*,
Pantheon, (New York:1989),p.173.
45. Bruce Oudes, ed., *From: The President-Richard Nixon ’s Secret Files*, Harper & Row (New York: 1989), p. 173.
46. James A Smith, *The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite*, Free Press (New York: 1991), p.282.
47. Sterling Seagrave, *Yellow Rain: A Journey Through The Terror of Chemical Warfare*, M. Evans and Co. (New York: 1981), pp. 258 “After a meeting with President Nixon, Representative Gerald Ford attacks politicians who criticize the Pentagon CBW efforts, saying the critics seem to favor ‘unilateral disarmament.”‘
48. Christopher Palmeri, “Act Three,” Forbes, October 26, 1992, p. 88
49. “Westmark Systems Expands Board, Hires 3 New Vice Presidents,” Wall Street Journal, February 11,1988, p.33.
52 “Hon. Samuel K. Skinner,” Congressional Record, Congressional Printing Office, Washington, D.C., August 1, 1985, pp. S10827, S10835.
54. Congressional Record, August 1,1985, p. S10823.
56. “Critics Cause Bush Cabinet Search to Stumble,” Los Angeles Times, December 22,1988.
57. Herman Rogan, *Traditions and Challenges: The Story of Sidley & Austin*, R.R. Donelly & Sons (Chicago: 1983), p.266.
58. *Who’s Who in America*, 48th ed., 1994.
60. “Deukmejian Thrives in Private Life, Law Work,” Los Angeles Times, January 3, 1992, p. Al.
61. “Chicago Law Firm Agrees to Pay Up to $34 Million in Lincoln S&L Case,” Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1991, p. D5;and “Sidley & Austin RTC Said to Reach Pact,” Wall Street Journal, October 31, 1991, p. B4. The basis of the suit was a memo written on May 10, 1988 by Margery Waxman, a partner in Sidley & Austin’s Washington office, to Charles Keating. In it, she said “pressure” had been applied to M. Danny Wall, then chairman of the Home Loan Bank Board, “to work toward meeting your demands and he
has so instructed his staff.”
62. “Suit Accuses 7 Drug Makers of Price-Fixing,” Los Angeles Times, October 15, 1993, p. Dl. Other pharmaceutical houses accused of
conspiring to fix prescription drug prices included Smith-Kline-Beecham, Ciba-Geigy Corp., American Home Products, Schering-Plough and Glaxo.
63. Ida Honorof, “FDA Coverup of Hazards of Nutra-Sweet,” Report to Consumers, Vol. XVIII, No.401, December, 1987. Also, “Two Ex-U.S. Prosecutors’ Roles in Case Against Searle are Questioned in Probe,” Wall Street Journal, February 7,1986, p. 4. Ironically, William Conlon won an appointment to the Illinois State Board of Ethics in 1982 (Kogan, p.359).
65. Los Angeles Times, December 22, 1988.
66. “Sam Skinner: A Pragmatist in a Storm,” Wall Street Journal, December 6, 1991.
67. “Samuel Knox Skinner,” New York Times, December 23, 1988.
69. “Statement from Adrian Gross, Former FDA Investigator and Scientist,” Congressional Record, August 1, 1985, p. S10835.
70. Congressional Record, August 1, 1985, p. S 10831, and “Statements from Adrian Gross,” p. S10838.
71. “FDA Handling of Research on NutraSweet is Defended,” New York Times, July 18, 1987, p. 50
72. H.J. Roberts, M.D.,*Aspartame (NutraSweet): Is it Safe?*, Charles Press (Philadelphia: 1990), p. 10.
73. Congressional Record, August 1, 1985, p. S108-28.
74. Ibid., p. S108-34.
77. “Sweet Suspicions,” three-part CBS Nightly News series, January 1984. Transcript reprinted in the Congressional Record, August 1,
1985, p. S108-26.
79. Raymond Bonner, “Searle Stock Query Held ‘Smokescreen,”‘ New York Times, February 29, 1984, p. D5
80. William Safire, “Sweet and Sour,” New York Times, June 1, 1984, p. A31.
81. Louis Wolf, “Accuracy in Media Rewrites the News and History,” Covert Action Information Bulletin, Number 21 (Spring 1984), pp. 24-37.
82. I.N. Love, “NutraSweet Isn’t that ‘Sweet,”‘ in Gentle Strength Times, October 1987, p.3.
84. “Complaints on Aspartame Lead to Nationwide Investigation,” Los Angeles Times, July 5, 1984, p. Hl.
85. “Federal Agency Sees Little Risk in Sweetener,” New York Times, November 2, 1984, p. A22.
86. Los Angeles Times, July 5, 1984.
87. New York Times, November 2, 1984.
88 “U.S. Study of Aspartame Finds no Serious Effects,” Washington Post, November 2, 1984, p. A18
89. “Pepsi Switches Sweeteners,” Washington Post, November 2, 1984, p. AI.
90. “Most Scientists in Poll Doubt NutraSweet’s Safety,” Washington Post, August 17, 1987, p. A23.
91. Roberts, p. 238.
92. Congressional Report, May 7, 1987, p. S5500.
93. “New Findings Back Use of Sweetener,” New York Times, August 1987, p. 30.
94. “Researchers Differ Over Long Range Effects of Sweetener,” Los Angeles Times, November 3, 1988, p. Hl.
95. Roberts, p. 244.
96. Roberts, p. 248.
97. “High Court Rejects Sweetener Review,” Washington Post, April 23, 1986, p. C.
98. Roberts,p. 246-47.